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D URING the survey period, Texas family law began to react percep-
tively to the tensions created by changing patterns of family. life. Our
courts were nearly overwhelmed by cases involving various family law mat-
ters. The most recent statistics-those for 1965 ' -indicate the combined to-
tal of divorce and annulment suits filed was 61,491; 41,365 of the disposed
cases were prosecuted to judgment.! Only 158 of these approximately one-
third of one per cent, resulted in denial of divorce or annulment. Exclud-
ing criminal cases, nearly two-fifths of the district court cases fell in the
class of dissolution of marriage.'
These figures of course do not include the vast number of other types of
actions heard by courts in which family law was at issue. The last available
figure-that for 1963-showed that Texas courts granted 9,620 adoptions,
trailing only California among all the states. No figures are available for
actions involving rights to custody or juvenile proceedings, but it may safe-
ly be assumed that the number is large.
Most family law is made in the trial courts. But, even so, several impor-
tant developments in family law did occur at the appellate level. Most sig-
nificant were cases touching upon adoption practice, bastardy, and child
custody-those sensitive areas of law in which the interests of children are
most intimately affected.
I. ADOPTION
In adoption law major developments result from the holding of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Armstrong v. Manzo and that of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Hendricks v. Curry.' The Armstrong case held
that the failure of a Texas court to give notice of a pending adoption to the
child's father was violative of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment. Causing almost as much dismay among the bar and judiciary
* B.B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University.
'TEX. CIv. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 88 (1965).
2 For an idea of the growth of actions for dissolution of *marriage, compare TEXAS CIVIL JUDI-
CIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL STATISTICS-STATE OF TEXAS 5 (1955). Figures reported there indicate
that ten years ago 47,511 divorce suits were disposed, 33,415 of these resulting in granting of
divorce.
aTEX. CIV. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 88.4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr No. 313 (86th ed. 1965).
5 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Supreme Court's opinion was adopted by the court of civil appeals
on remand, In re Adoption of Armstrong, 394 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
6401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 684 (1966).
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was the Hendricks case, with its holding that dependent child proceedings
were, in effect, limited to truly dependent or neglected children and thus not
available as a basis for adoption except in a small number of cases. As a
result of the two opinions, the procedures that must be followed in Texas
to insure that an adoption decree will be a final, binding determination of
family status are altered radically.
By way of background to the problems raised by these cases, Texas'
adoption statute, article 46a, has long provided that no adoption may be
decreed without the "written" consent of the parent, or parents, of the
child to be adopted.' Parental consent may, however, be dispensed with if
a parent has (1) deserted the child for two years, leaving it in the "care,
custody, control and management" of others; or (2) failed to contribute
to the support of the child "substantially" and "commensurate with his
financial ability" for two years; or (3) had his parental rights terminated
by a court of "competent jurisdiction."' Upon allegation and affidavit of
any of these circumstances, the statute permits designated judges to consent
to the adoption in lieu of the parent or parents whose rights in their chil-
dren are forfeited by their conduct. As practice developed around this
statute, notice to parents was dispensed with if their consent was not re-
quired.!
In Armstrong v. Manzo," Armstrong, the father, was given no notice of
his child's pending adoption by Manzo, the stepfather. Manzo's wife, the
mother, gave her consent, but Armstrong's consent was deemed unneces-
sary because of his alleged failure to support the child.1 Accordingly, the
judge of the local juvenile court signed the requisite consent (as authorized
by article 46a (b), and Manzo's petition for adoption was granted by the
district court. Armstrong was then informed by letter of the trial court's
action; he immediately commenced proceedings to set aside the adoption
decree. The trial court refused to grant him relief, and Armstrong's ap-
peal to the court of civil appeals was fruitless.' His petition to the Su-
preme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari was granted.
In reversing the judgment, the Court stated:
It is clear that failure to give the petitioner [Armstrong] notice of the
pending adoption proceeding violated the most rudimentary demands of due
7 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 6 (Supp. 1966).
s Ibid.
'The Texas court's justification of the absence of a requirement of notice is based upon the
availability of a subsequent hearing to the parent who did not receive notice; the argument has
recently been restated in Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1965), 44 TEXAs L. REv.
364.1o 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
"1 See text accompanying note 7 supra. For the quantum of proof of non-support, see Burrell
v. VanLoh, 404 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Gilley v. Anthony, 404 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
"In re Adoption of Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error rcf. n.r.e.
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process of law .... [Although questions of the sufficiency of notice can arise]
as to the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt where, as
here, the result of the judicial proceeding was permanently to deprive a
legitimate parent of all that parenthood implies. 3
With similar directness the Court disposed of the argument that the
absence of notice to the parent was cured by the subsequent hearing afford-
ed him:
It [the opportunity to be heard required by due process] is an opportunity
which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
The trial court could have accorded this right to the witness only by granting
his motion to set aside the decree and consider the case anew. . . . Only that
would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied
had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place.'4
Gauging the effect of the Armstrong case is not difficult, at least insofar
as Texas adoption practice is concerned: failure to serve notice of a pend-
ing adoption on a non-consenting parent will result in a decree that is a
nullity as to that parent. A non-consenting, unnotified parent thus does
not lose any of the parental rights" he would have had if there had been
no adoption.
Closing the door on ex parte adoption was no more consternating to the
bar than the decision in Hendricks v. Curry." There the Supreme Court of
Texas circumscribed the use of article 2330," the dependent child statute.
This statute permits a court to adjudge a child dependent or neglected if
the child is "dependent upon the public for support," "destitute, homeless
or abandoned," or without "proper parental care or guardianship."
The importance of dependency proceedings in Texas adoption law can-
not be exaggerated because of the common use of such a proceeding as a
prelude to adoption. Commonly, attorneys in both privately"°-and insti-
tutionallye--arranged adoptions commence a dependent child proceeding
prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption suit. Under the adoption
statute, a finding that a child is dependent or neglected is a sufficient"'
termination of parental rights to justify substitution of court consent to
an adoption for that of the parents. Aside from the aspect of consent, the
"3380 U.S. at 550.
14 1d. at $52.
"s Whitehead v. Lout, 395 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Note, Notice and Adoption-
The Requirements of Due Process, 19 Sv. L.J. 413, 418 (1965).
"Parental rights include, inter alia, those of custody, inheritance, companionship and services.
TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 9 (1959).
"401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1966).
"TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (1964).
"See, e.g., Leddon v. Herman, 402 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"See, e.g., Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
" Strictly speaking, a dependency proceeding is a temporary change of custody for the benefit
of the child neglected by its parents and dependent upon the public for support. TEx. Rev. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2337 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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so-called "d/n" proceeding is attractive because of its speed and the ab-
sence of a requirement of notice to a parent outside the county in which
the action is brought.22 Hendricks v. Curry illustrates graphically the reli-
ance of the bar on the statute in adoption cases and the abuses possible
under a statute that was intended primarily for the protection of waifs.
Betty Shellenberger Hendricks prior to her marriage bore a child out of
wedlock. In a private arrangement with an attorney, she surrendered the
infant and gave her written consent to its adoption by a couple represented
by the attorney. The Currys were that couple; they filed their petition for
adoption in Dallas County, alleging Mrs. Hendricks' consent as a basis for
granting the adoption. Prior to the hearing the mother withdrew her con-
sent after learning the Currys' identity and filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by which the Currys' and her relative rights of custody
could be tested. A nonsuit was immediately taken by the prospective adop-
ters, who then instituted both dependency and adoption proceedings in an
adjacent county. No notice was given Mrs. Hendricks of either action, and
the child was adjudged dependent two days later. This judgment was
then made the basis of an allegation in the adoption petition justifying the
waiver of the mother's consent. When Mrs. Hendricks learned of the vari-
ous proceedings, she filed an action to set aside the dependency judgment
and a petition of intervention in the adoption suit. After a hearing on the
respective claims of the parties the trial court let stand its finding of de-
pendency and granted the Currys' adoption petition. This judgment was
affirmed by the court of civil appeals."
This record presented a Gordian knot of difficulties to the supreme
court. Two principal questions were raised-the question of the binding
effect of a dependency order entered without notice to Mrs. Hendricks and
that of the applicability of article 2330 to the fact situation. The court re-
fused the Alexandrian solution of striking down the dependency proceed-
ing on the constitutional notice problem suggested by Armstrong v. Manzo.
Instead they read the statute closely and by a restrictive construction
effectively foreclosed dependency proceedings as the first step of a two-step
adoption process in all but a few cases. As the court applied the statute, the
facts did not support a finding that the child was dependent, and thus
Mrs. Hendricks' consent to the adoption was necessary. Since her consent
had been withdrawn, the adoption was an apparent nullity."4
22 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2332 (1964). This provision is of doubtful constitutionality;
without any doubt a custody decree rendered without notice would not be entitled to full faith
and credit in a sister state. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1954).
2 lendricks v. Curry, 384 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
"'Semblc as to the holding that the adoption was a nullity. The court reversed and rendered
the judgment of adoption on the ground that vacating the judgment of dependency left no basis
for the adoption decree since without it Mrs. Hendricks' consent would be required, and this had
been withdrawn. 401 S.W.2d at 802.
1967]
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Under the not untypical circumstances of this case, the court could have
sustained the finding of dependency only by holding that the child was
dependent upon the public for support, was destitute, homeless or aband-
oned, or did not have proper parental care or guardianship." Justice Smith's
opinion pointed out first that the child was obviously not dependent upon
the public for support because the Currys were entrusted with both
de facto custody and obligation to support, and thus no basis for a depend-
ency finding based on that portion of the statute could be found in the
evidence.
As to the second alternative, the court held that a parent's relinquish-
ment of custody coupled with consent to adoption does not constitute
"abandonment" under article 2330 and was not evidence that would sup-
port a judgment of dependency. Sensibly, the court held that the same
definition of "abandonment" should apply in dependency proceedings as
in adoption proceedings, namely acts "as would apply conscious disregard
or indifference"2" to the child. Using this standard, the court stated that
Mrs. Hendricks' conduct was "all too plain to permit of quibbling" not
abandonment."7
With respect to the third possibility, that the Hendricks' child was de-
pendent because it had not "proper parental care," the court construed
"parental" broadly, holding that the word was not intended to apply only
to parents. Instead, the "parental care" as used in the dependency statute
has a broader significance, designating not only parents but also "persons
who occupy a parental position in the life of a child, either permanently or
temporarily." 8 Since the Currys were furnishing "proper parental care"
within the ambit of this broad definition, no evidence was presented to
the trial court which would justify a judgment of dependency on that
ground.
Because of these two important cases Texas adoption practice must be
altered radically. Dependency proceedings as an integral part of either pri-
vate or institutional adoptions are limited to those relatively rare instances
in which the child is truly neglected by its parents and dependent upon the
public for support.2 Removing (as a practical matter) dependency judg-
" These three possibilities are alternatives in article 2330, as are findings that the child is a per-
son ". . . who habitually begs or receives alms, or who is found living in any house of ill fame or
with any vicious or disreputable person, or . . . whose parents or guardian permit it to use intox-
icating liquor except for medicinal purposes or to become addicted to the use of such liquor.
' 401 S.W.2d at 801.
2 Ibid.
55 Id. at 802.
2This may be an overstatement, but Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208
(Tex. 1966) discussed in the next section, causes me to doubt that I exaggerate. There the father
of a child conceived out of wedlock was permitted to plead and prove his parental interest in the
child, and hence his right to litigate custody, after the child had been declared dependent. The
court said rather pointedly "Plaintiff had no notice . . . and the child was not, in fact, dependent
and neglected." Id. at 209, even though the points were not in issue.
[Vol. 21
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ments as a basis for dispensing with consent leaves only the two two-year
exceptions of abandonment and non-support. Adoptions without consent
will be rare, now, as was probably intended. In those few actions that will
be attempted, the constitutional requirement that notice be given a non-
consenting parent will result in decrees that do not bind the adopted child's
parents unless personal jurisdiction was obtained.
We may fairly say that the Armstrong and Hendricks cases preclude all
but those adoptions in which parental consent is given. But does the prob-
lem end if consent is given? Consent to adoption is not waiver of process,3°
and even if it were, article 2224"' prohibits waiver of process or entry of
appearance until an action is commenced. An adoption proceeding is rather
clearly an action, and the parent constitutionally (and statutorily)3" has an
interest in the subject matter of the suit-his child. If this analysis of con-
sent-waiver is accepted by the Texas courts, no adoptions under the present
statute would be binding on the parents unless it could be shown that the
court had jurisdiction of their persons by virtue of service or appearance.
II. MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY
One notable case was decided in the past year in this area of family law.
Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska" involved the meaning of section 42
of the Probate Code, which provides that: "Where a man, having by a
woman a child or children shall afterwards intermarry with such woman,
such child or children shall thereby be legitimate and made capable of in-
heriting his estate." The question of the construction and application of
this provision arose in an unusual fashion.
Kaska's child was conceived by the mother out of wedlock; subsequent
to conception, but before birth, Kaska married the woman. However, the
marriage was annulled on the mother's application before the child was
born. She then placed the child for adoption with the Home of the Holy
Infancy, a licensed child placement agency. Her consent to an adoption to
be arranged by the agency was also given. The home had the child de-
clared dependent and neglected under a fictitious name and placed the child
for adoption; Kaska did not consent to this adoption.
Kaska learned somehow that the home had information of his child's
whereabouts and instituted a custody suit. As presented to the supreme
court, the question was one of standing-more specifically, of whether the
child was legitimate under these facts. If legitimate, Kaska could bring the
"°Compare Leddon v. Herman, 402 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), holding invalid a
mother's waiver of service and consent to judgment in a dependency proceeding.31TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (1964).
32 See note 16 slipra.
13 3 97 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 855.
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action; if illegitimate, he had no interest in the child and therefore no
standing."
In holding that the child was legitimate, the court had to overcome diffi-
cult constructional problems. First, the provision in question is entitled
"Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children," making possible a construc-
tion limiting its application to rights of inheritance only. Second, Kaska
did not marry the mother after the birth of the child, as one construction
of the statute would seem to require for legitimation. Third, the marriage
was annulled, and a traditional doctrine of annullment is that the annulled
marriage is void ab initio, resulting in bastardization of the progeny of an
annulled marriage under a theory of relation back of the annulment decree
to the date of marriage.
Justice Walker's opinion overcame the difficulties, giving Kaska the right
to maintain his custody suit and inferentially requiring that he consent to
the adoption. The court rejected easily the argument that section 42 does
not fully legitimate bastards when its conditions are met. Statutory his-
tory, holdings under similar statutes, and the internal structure and pro-
visions of the statute itself were relied upon to reach the conclusion that
the legal relationship existing between a father and his legitimated child is
"the same as that existing between a father and his legitimate child.""5 As
to the problem of the child's birthday vis-/,-vis the date of the marriage,
the court reasoned that a holding other than legitimation by marriage any-
time after conception would result in a hiatus of several months, and re-
fused so to construe the statute.
Recognizing that the effect of annulment on legitimacy was the most
difficult of the questions presented in the case, the court refused to apply
the common-law rule which bastardizes children of an annulled marriage
and chose to follow the rule that the doctrine of relation back of the an-
nulment decree should not be used in determining legitimacy. Pointing
out that if the Kaskas had remained married the child would have been
legitimate, the court found no justice in a principle bastardizing children
when a marriage is dissolved for prenuptial causes, particularly when the
opposite result would have been reached if the marriage was dissolved by
divorce for postnuptial causes."
The enlightened approach by the court to the problem of illegitimacy
is most commendable. Texas now falls with that group of states having lib-
eral legitimation provisions. Because Texas stands almost alone in her refusal
" In Texas the father of an illegitimate child has no legal relationship to the child. Absent are
obligations of support and rights of inheritance, custody, etc. Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska,
397 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex. 1965).
DId. at 211.
a TEx. REv. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 4639 (1960) provides: "A divorce shall not in anywise
affect the legitimacy of the parents so divorced .... "
[Vol. 21
FAMILY LAW
to require support from fathers of illegitimates, however, the gain from the
decision unfortunately is merely an amelioration of a harsh body of law.
The court did all it can. Legislation must complete the task.
III. DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
Little need be said of annulment. The Kaskza case was the only decision
in which annulment was involved; the refusal of the supreme court to
relate the decree of annulment back to the date of marriage if rights of
parties other than the spouses are involved is significant only against the
background of common-law principles of voidness ab initio. Presumably
relation back will still apply when rights, for example in property, of the
parties to the annulment are involved."
Divorce cases reaching the courts of civil appeals during the past year
were probably indicative of appellate uncertainty of their place in the di-
vorce process. The majority of the appeals involved divorces sought on the
basis of cruel treatment by one spouse or the other." Tracing the statutory
requirement that divorces be granted only on "full and satisfactory" evi-
dence,"' the courts' unhappiness with the facts brought before them seemed
patent. Virtually all the courts recited with litanous regularity the well-
established rules governing review of divorce proceedings; then reached
often-divergent results. Mild physical and verbal abuse justifies both
granted"0 and denied" divorces, as did evidence of little more than in-
compatibility."2
Probably the most graphic illustration of the problems besetting the
courts in divorce suits occurred when a court of civil appeals divided on
the question of whether the plaintiff's evidence was "full and satisfac-
tory.""3 The majority and minority could not agree on whether insults, ar-
guments and possible mild physical abuse constituted cruelty, but the ma-
jority was unwilling to reverse the trial court's granting of the divorce.
37 In the Kaska case the court states "The annulment decree may relate back to the time of
the marriage as between the parties .... "
2STix. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(1) (1960) permits divorce if "either party is guilty
of excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages . . . [which] render living together insupportable." An
exception to the cruelty pattern was a decision of one of the infrequent cases of divorce under the
seven-year "living apart" provision, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(4) (1960), of the
divorce statute. The Waco court correctly held that fault was not a necessary element of proof
and that the usual defenses were not available. Fields v. Fields, 399 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). The wife based her defense to the action on a claim that the period of separation was made
possible (or necessary) because the husband contracted a bigamous marriage, preventing her from
living with him.
3
STEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4632 (1960).
4(Ritter v. Ritter, 395 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
• ' Boenker v. Boenker, 405 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"'Cote v. Cote, 404 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed (divorce granted);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 397 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (divorce denied); Gentry v. Gentry,
394 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (divorce denied).
43 404 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
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The wife had based her suit for divorce on the husband's cruelty. Evidence
adduced at the trial seemed to reflect that dissension was caused primarily
by the wife's superior earning ability. His acts of cruelty consisted of pub-
lic disparagement ("perhaps because of" the fact her earnings constituted
seventy per cent of family income), closing her charge accounts, and with-
drawing money from a joint bank account. The court said, "The trial
judge was justified in finding that this course of conduct, when directed
toward a woman whom the judge observed and whose sensibilities, charac-
ter and personality he had a chance to evaluate, was of such nature as to
render the further living together . . . insupportable." ' The dissenter was
unable to find proof justifying a divorce; he pointed out divorce does not
lie for "incompatibility, or because they [the spouses] live unhappily to-
gether, for marital wranglings, or merely because they possess tempers."4
The case indicates as well an increasingly-limited definition of condona-
tion. The parties lived together from August, when divorce was first dis-
cussed by them, to January, when the divorce was filed. Indeed, they break-
fasted together in their home the morning the husband was served with ci-
tion. On this issue the court said: [C]ondonation involves not only
the concept of forgiveness by the offended, it also proceeds on the idea of
repentance by the offender, and it is not operative where subsequent facts
show that no repentance, in fact, existed." ' The dissenting judge did not
comment on this part of the case, but the parties' objectivity toward di-
vorce appeared to disturb him.
IV. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
Strong judicial opinions that placed children's welfare above the parents'
wishes indicated the courts' increasing concern about near-absolute parental
rights. In important cases the supreme court refused to hold that proof of
parenthood alone entitles a litigant to custody against proof that the best
interests of the child require custody in others. The courts of civil appeals
were similarly occupied with problems of custody in which the interests of
parents were pitted against the claims of third parties.
Certainly the most important supreme court case was Herrera v. Her-
rera." There the child's mother instituted a custody suit by a petition for
habeas corpus against the paternal grandparents, basing her right to custody
of the eight-year old boy almost totally upon her maternity. She sought to
44 Id. at 141.
" ibid.
4Id. at 146.
471d. at 142. Compare Ritter v. Ritter, 395 SW.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) in which the
parties lived together for seven years while the acts of cruelty were taking place; condonation was
held not to exist because of the continuance of hostilities after separation.
"409 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1966).
[Vol. 21
FAMILY LAW
remove the child from the grandparents' home where he had lived since in-
fancy, when the mother relinquished custody to them. Evidence indicated
that both mother and grandparents were in a position to offer to the child
substantially equivalent living conditions. Indeed, the trial court found
that both the mother and the grandparents were "fit and proper" persons to
be awarded custody.4' However, the evidence also showed that the child did
not know his mother, did not want to live with her in preference to the
grandparents, and was disturbed at the prospect of the possible change. The
trial court refused to restore custody to the mother, but the court of civil
appeals reversed."0
The supreme court ruled in favor of the grandparents while reiterating
the established rule that the best interests of the child are paramount. The
opinion pointed out that custody with the parents is presumptively in the
best interests of a child, but the presumption is rebutted by proof that the
welfare of the child requires custody to be placed in others. Per Herrera
and many other cases," this difficult determination is entrusted to the trial
court and may be tested on appeal only by the standard of abuse of dis-
cretion."
Hendricks v. Curry" and Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska" similarly
recognized the right of the courts and the state to determine whether a
child's parents are fit to have custody. In each case a parent brought habeas
corpus proceedings against persons who had been given custody of the child
but who were unrelated to the child. Although the issue of custody merely
furnished the framework for deciding questions of broader import in each
case the supreme court carefully severed the issue of right to custody and
remanded to the trial court for determination of that issue. A spate of
decisions by courts of civil appeals also recognized that the parents' right of
custody is not inviolate, even against third persons.5
What may be a hiatus in the law is revealed by these opinions. With
Hendricks v. Curry's limitation of dependency proceedings to the few cases
in which proof exists that a child is a waif or that his surroundings are
conducive to moral or physical danger, no procedure is available to deprive
a parent of custody when the "best interests" of the child so require. Be-
4In re Herrera, 402 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" Ibid. The opinion of the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals is well worth reading in conjunction
with that of the supreme court because the two together point up the problem of the conflict that
may exist between the parent's and the child's rights.
s1 E.g., Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963).
"The court of civil appeals was able on the same facts to find that an abuse of discretion existed.
"401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1966). For discussion, see text accompanying notes 17-29 supra.
4 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1966). For discussion, see text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
5 Cox v. Young, 405 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (father versus stepfather); Leddon v.
Herman, 402 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (mother versus adopting parents); Barrie v.
Costello, 401 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (mother versus maternal grandmother); Scozzari
v. Curtis, 398 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (father versus maternal grandparents).
1967]
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tween "best interests" and "dependent and neglected" exists a considerable
gulf. If the parent surrenders custody to someone who wishes to stand
in loco parentis and has any reasonable basis for that claim, the question of
the child's welfare can be presented to a court when the parent seeks to re-
establish his right to custody by habeas corpus. But if the child is in the
parent's custody, the stricter standard prevails. That this distinction be-
tween depriving or restoring a parent's right of custody should exist is at
least arguable. A greater showing of unfitness for custody properly may be
requisite when the parent has custody of his child than when he is seeking
to regain custody for a change is sought contrary to the normal run of af-
fairs.' If the interest of the child should be the dominant consideration,
however, the narrow range of grounds in the dependency statute should be
expanded.
All the news in custody cases did not arise from independent suits. Cases
involving determinations of custody in divorce were frequent. Article
46397 authorizes the court in divorce proceedings "to give the custody and
education of the children to either father or mother, as the court shall deem
right and proper." Article 4639a(1) s further empowers the trial court to
make such orders of custody and support as are for the "best interest" of
the children. Perennial problems arise under these provisions concerning
the power of the courts to arrange custody and visitation and otherwise
regulate the life of the child consistent with parental desires. Ex parte
Miller"' presented such a problem. Upon their divorce the spouses agreed to
give custody of the children to the mother and to place a daughter in a par-
ticular school; this agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree.
The trial court then held the mother in contempt for refusing to place the
child in the school. On writ of habeas corpus the supreme court held that
the statutes did not empower the divorcing court to order attendance at a
particular school.
However, the trial court's power under article 4639a to limit the child's
residence to a particular county was sustained in Lebowitz v. Lebowitz,"
although the order in question was held to be an abuse of discretion under
the facts of the case. There the jury awarded custody to the mother, who
contended the residence limitation contravened the jury's finding and was
thus beyond the power of the court." In overruling this contention the
'"A parent is the natural guardian of his child and as such entitled to custody. TEx. PRon.
CODE ANN. S 109 (1956).5 7t TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4639 (1960).
58 Ibid.
59400 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1966).
o0403 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
e Article 4639a, § 1 was amended in 1961 to provide the court's custody order "must conform




court reaffirmed the "large equity powers and obligations""2 of a court to
form orders for the welfare of the children. 3
Support cases in the past year typically were based on questions of evi-
dence. Two cases construed article 4639a-1,14 which authorizes a divorcing
court to require support payments for any unmarried child who is: "(1)
. . . physically or mentally unsound and requires custodial care, and (2)
• . . cannot adequately take care of and provide for himself, and (3) . . .
has no personal estate or income sufficient to provide for himself." Both
cases concerned children above eighteen years of age who were unemploy-
able except in special settings, one because of mental retardation"' and the
other because of schizophrenia. " Neither court was willing to require the
father to support his children. A restrictive definition of custodial care was
adopted that limited the power of a court to utilize the statute's provisions
to near-institutional cases. In Aversa v. Aversa°' the court attributed to the
legislature an intent to provide only for care "which involves a degree of
attention requiring more or less continuous personal supervision.'" " This is
indeed a close, harsh construction of the statute, but one that will probably
be followed.
In Hutchings v. Bates,6 ' the supreme court decided on first impression
that a child support agreement (as opposed to an order of the court) was
a contractual obligation enforceable against the estate of a deceased father.
Recognizing that two views of the obligation to support are possible, the
court opted for the one they thought "more likely to carry out the inten-
tion of the parties and achieve just results.""6 Again, the supreme court
came down on a result favoring the interests of children, pointedly reject-
ing a line of authority that was more legalistic than humane.
V. CONCLUSION
Family law cases decided during the survey period reflected more than
anything else the courts' problems with an archaic body of law. The su-
preme court obviously is concerned; the number and significance of their
6" 403 S.W.2d at 874.
"3A recent case held these powers do not extend to requiring the child's custodian's written
consent to visitation, however, despite a trial court finding that this was a reasonable limitation
required for the children's best interests. Hill v. Hill, 404 S.W.2d 641 (Tex, Civ. App. 1966).
The appellate court probably felt that the trial court relinquished its power to the custodian by
this condition.
-°vx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4639a-1 (Supp. 1966).
0' Byrne v. Byrne, 398 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
o Aversa v. Aversa, 405 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
67a.
56 Id. at 15 9.
09406 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966), for further discussion see Galvin, Wills and Trusts, this
Survey at footnote 27. For commentary on the civil appeals holding, see 19 Sw. L.J. 666 (1965).
70 Id. at 421.
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opinions involving the welfare of children are unequaled in recent years.
More important than the number of cases, though, was the court's broadly
humanitarian concern for the interests of children. Their responsiveness to
these delicate problems and their willingness to work out difficult but just
solutions was the most important development of the period.
